




Youth Bulges and Political Violence: An Overview

Presentation at the PRIO/World Bank conference on 'Youth Exclusion and Political
Violence: Breaking the Link and Engaging Young People Positively in Development
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World Youth Population




Defining internal armed conflict

- Incompatibility over government/territory
- Armed force
- At least two organized parties
- One is the government of a state
- Minimum 25 battle-related deaths per year

Uppsala/PRIO conflict data (Gleditsch et al., 2002)

Armed Conflicts, 1946-2006



Youth Bulges

- The opportunity perspective
 - Low opportunity cost
 - Relative cohort size
 - Economic growth
 - Education

Youth Bulges

- The grievance perspective
 - Unemployment
 - Education
 - Democracy
 - Urbanization

Empirical Analysis

Age composition and political violence 1950–2000

| | Armed conflict onset | Terrorism | Riots and violent demonstrations |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|---|
| Youth bulges | Higher risk | Higher risk | Higher risk |
| YB * Economic growth | Not significant | Higher risk | Not significant |
| YB * Dependency ratio | Not significant | Not significant | Higher risk |
| YB * Regime type | Higher risk | Not significant | Not significant |
| YB * Tertiary edu growth | Not significant | Higher risk | Not significant |

Urdal, Henrik 2006. 'A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence', *International Studies Quarterly* 50(3): 607–630.


Qualifications

- No threshold values
- Robust for low-intensity conflict, not wars
- Demography is not destiny
- Governments hold the key
- Challenges: the evidence base is limited;
lack of competent government


The Future of Youth Bulges

- Fertility and youth bulges decline universally
- As fertility declines, a demographic window of opportunity opens
- The realization of this opportunity is not given
- Many countries and regions will face a significant demographic challenge for decades to come


South Korea



Iran



Afghanistan




Risk of Armed Conflict

Table 1 *Risk of Armed Conflict, 1950–2007*

| Explanatory Variables | Model 1 | Model 2 Low growth, Ages 0-14 | Model 3 High growth, Ages 0-14 |
|---------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Youth Bulges β z | 0.036* (2.26) | -0.003 (-0.008) | 0.117*** (2.77) |
| Control Variables | | | |
| Total Population (ln) | 0.279*** (5.79) | 0.385*** (3.27) | 0.259*** (2.84) |
| Infant Mortality Rate | 0.005*** (3.11) | 0.013* (2.41) | 0.010*** (3.05) |
| Regime Type | -0.002 (-0.13) | -0.015 (-0.47) | 0.009 (0.36) |
| Regime Type Squared | -0.013*** (-4.91) | -0.007 (-0.86) | -0.009 (-1.86) |
| Missing Regime Data | -0.821 (-1.51) | -0.552 (0.58) | -0.163 (-0.15) |
| Brevity of Peace | 1.331*** (4.81) | 2.406*** (3.29) | 0.723 (1.49) |
| Constant | -7.07*** (-9.31) | -8.13*** (-4.87) | -10.17*** (-5.30) |
| N | 7,033 | 2,181 | 1,985 |
| Log Likelihood | -827.15 | -140.73 | -307.25 |
| Pseudo R ² | 0.090 | 0.135 | 0.066 |

Trends in Predicted Avg Conflict Risk



Points for Consideration at Conference

- What are the conditions that facilitate the inclusion of youth in development?
- Current research on youth in conflict
 - The role of education
 - Urban youth exclusion
- Where are the research gaps?
- What does policy-makers request?